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In line with global sector reforms, policy and institutional arrangements have been 
established in acknowledgement of the difficulty of creating competitive markets in 
infrastructure industries such as telecommunications and to deal with any market failure
Specialised agencies have been set up specifically to deal with the complex and dynamic 
nature of the industry and their critical role of creating an environment conducive to 
investment, supporting macro economic objectives and serving the consumer welfare 
which are often in tension with each other.
In alignment with the reform process they have been been given carefully determined 
powers to constrain the pursuits of excessive profit resulting from the market structure but 
in ways that would but accountable to ensure fairness & avoid capricious behaviour by 
regulator
In this particular area under review the law requires that the rates be regulated through a 
process that seeks to make transparent to the regulator prices of the operator to ensure 
that they are cost based and in line with the prices of other operators international 
benchmarking
In terms of the law Parliament has responsibility for the appointment of decision- makers 
and oversight of the regulators responsible for implementation of the law in the sector
Parliament’s highlighting of this regulatory bottleneck should be welcomed not least of all 
for bringing some historically opaque regulatory issues into the public domain. But what this 
has also done is confirmed the complexity of the process and historical difficulties of 
information asymmetries that plague regulation of infrastructure industries.
Institutional and process considerations considerations...
Parliament has oversight of the institutions responsible for implementation of the law in the 
sector and is required to intervene in cases of regulatory failure but it cannot have been intended 
that the technical regulatory processes to determine costs of services be substituted with a 
parliamentary process
But it is critical that the the institutional and or legal and indeed policy problems that have 
produced this it be addressed. Prices are some of the best indicators of policy outcomes. They 
directly reflect the policy, market structures and regulatory effectiveness of infrastructure 
industries.
Interconnection termination rates are high by international standards. But they are just one 
symptom of a highly inefficient market which combined with ineffectual regulation have produced 
exorbitant prices across a range of services - whether it be leased lines a critical input for other 
business or broadband services and which has not optimally served an emerging economy nor 
the consumer welfare.
That being said, intervention in the public interest is long overdue, all our evidence suggests that 
interconnection prices are very high by international and even African standards. The 
development of the sector is too critical to the country hence the complex institutional 
arrangements that exist in law for the sector to be regulated through political pressure and moral 
suasion alone. It is imperative that the factors that that have contributed to this regulatory 
impasse, legal bottlenecks, regulatory capacity, institutional arrangements, will need to 
addressed, otherwise you will need to be here next week to deal to ensure that the benefits of 
the reduction in mobile termination rates and the following week leased lines and the week after 
that on broadband....
Institutional and process considerations considerations...
Situation in South Africa
ICASA should have regulated termination rates according to the law
Regulatory bottlenecks: chapter 10, institutional capacity, no 
implementation yet. 
Within this framework there are a number of options
Complete market study 
Regulate without study (ECN opinion)
Amend Chapter 10
Alternative to determine a price and glide path based outside the 
formal process
International benchmarking
Allows operators to demonstrate their cost of termination based on LRIC




















Calls to fixed-line are outrageously expensive 














Million Mobile cellular telephone subscribers (ITU)
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Interconnection Background
Interconnection Price
Consensus: cost based interconnection prices
Monopolies requires cost-based pricing
Cost of efficient operator = incentive to invest in efficient technologies
In general, interconnection prices should 
Promote economic efficiency
Provide incentives to invest in new technologies, reduce costs and expand 
product offerings
Promote competition 
Promote universal service by encouraging rapid uptake through low retail 
prices
Interconnection Price - Too High
Higher mobile termination rates make it harder for fixed and 
small mobile operators to compete with large mobile 
operators (EU press release 7 May 2009) 
Customers will be paying more than they need to
Incumbent can prevent new entrants from gaining market share
High MTR = high off-net price... high off-net prices of dominant 
mobile operator makes it expensive to be called for people 
changing to new entrant or smaller operators
Causing traffic imbalance
Net termination payment outflow of new entrants 







Off-net Price  >  On-net price = expensive to switch
(Initially mostly on-net calls, after switching mostly off-net calls)
On-net = calls within network
Off-net = calls from one network to another
Interconnection Price - Too Low
Below cost recovery of terminating network
Arbitrage traffic routing may result in undesirable economic 
outcomes (France: Bill and Keep)
Often sited: Incumbent operators may not invest in the network 
or maintain its quality. However...
Operators build their networks to make money off their subscribers
Termination revenue makes up around 10-20% of total revenue
Arguing that low termination rates could lead to low network investment is far 
fetched
Receiving party benefits from the call too, therefore the terminating network 
provides a service for own subscribers
Dominant Operators will argue
They use termination revenue to subsidise access and 
usage (Two sided market or waterbed effect argument), If 
MTRs are lowered:
Retail prices will increase
There will be less subscribers
Operators will invest less
However, the opposite is the case
Increased competition leads to lower retail prices and more subscribers







1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Average MTR in US Cents
Mobile subscribers per 100 Inhabitants
OECD low mobile user basket price in 
2008 compared to 2006






















MTR and Mobile Usage cost came down in 21 EU countries
Price change of dominant operator only
Two sided markets
Two Principles:
Interdependent prices: Price are being determined 
interdependently, ie changing the price for the one 
side will change the price of the other side
No Cost causation: No direct link between 
incremental cost for a good or service and the price
Two sided markets
Two Principles:
Interdependent prices: Price are being determined 
interdependently, ie changing the price for the one side 
will change the price of the other side
No Cost causation: No direct link between incremental 
cost for a good or service and the price
Readers Newspaper Advertisers
Newspaper - lower price per newspaper = more 
subscribers and higher advertising revenue per page
However, few high income subscriber could be better 
than many low income subscribers for advertising 
revenue
Advertisers have a choice where to place an add 
(competition), while call termination is a monopoly
No Waterbed effect
The waterbed effect describes a situation where if mobile 
termination rates go down, some other prices need to go up, 
usually usage and access prices
A Waterbed is dumb, has no options, is not profit maximising
Businesses are smart, have options, are profit maximising
Sell little dearly or a lot cheaply holds, MTR reduction: 
Off-net price drop: more outgoing (other networks) minutes
Off-net price drop of other network: more incoming termination 
minutes
Off-net constant, make more money for each outgoing minute
No waterbed effect, setting prices is 
a matter of choice for operators
On-net
Operator A
up up up constant constant constant down down down
On-net Off-net









up constant down up constant down up constant down
High MTR = subsidisation 
within the sector
Why should subscribers of 
one network subsidise 
subscribers from other 
networks?
Why should one operator be 
given a subsidy to role out 
network infrastructure at the 
expense of another operators?
Price change of Telkom if MTR 






Telkom Prepaid to Mobile
Telkom Prepaid to Mobile at MT 0.6
Telkom Prepaid to Mobile at MT 0.3
2007/8 Nationally representative 
household survey
% of households that avoid calling mobile phones to save cost
% of households that plan calls during off-peak times to save cost
% of households: cost of calls to mobile phones during peak time is very high 53%
76.3%
81.9%
30 million US$ untapped fixed-line market in SA
2.35 million households that would be willing and able to 
spend at least 5 US$ a month
Cross country comparisons as 
smoke screens
USA and India both are or were RPNP (India changed recently to CPNP). 
There is no doubt that CPNP is superior to RPNP for penetration, but that is not 
the point of discussion here
CEG / Ofcom Study: Facts or fiction?
CPNP or B&K, not mutually exclusive
“The 3% B&K observations are accounted for by the United States.”
OECD basket methodology (Teligen database) only captures prices of 
dominant operators, not new entrants and small operator
A country penetration level  is influenced by many factor






Preventing distortions and promoting competition
Deliver maximum benefit for consumers (choice, price and quality of service)
Termination rates should be brought down to the cost of an efficient 
operator - Cost Model:
Bottom-up LRIC, only taking into account cost that are caused by the provision of 
wholesale call termination (the increment)
Mobile and fixed core network based on NGN
Mobile access network based on a combination of 2G and 3G
Asymmetric termination rate for max 4 years: if incremental unit costs higher
ERG: for transitional period if cost based: 
Lower economy of scale (low call volume and subscriber 
numbers) 
Operators have different network coverage (Metro networks)
Objective cost differences through technology (1800 Mhz 
compared to 900 Mhz eg)
Keeps off-net prices of dominant operators high: 
enforces traffic imbalance 
Asymmetric Termination rates
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Market Share 17% 25% 31% 44%
Coverage 96% 96% 96% 96%










Voice On-Net 13.4 0.93 10.7 0.74 9.6 0.66 8.9 0.62
Voice Termination 7.3 0.51 5.9 0.41 5.3 0.37 5 0.35
Voice Origination 6.4 0.44 5.2 0.36 4.6 0.32 4.2 0.29
Termination share 
of on-net
54.48% 55.14% 55.21% 56.18%
WIK 2007 study for Australia:TSLRIC





SEK 0.358 0.275 0.227 0.201 0.183





SEK 0.213 0.204 0.175 0.144 0.125
ZAR 0.267 0.256 0.219 0.181 0.157
Analysys 2007 study for PTS in 
Sweden based on LRIC
 Austria 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Operator 1 Euro Cents 6.67 5.69 4.40 3.40 3.08
ZAR 0.80 0.69 0.53 0.41 0.37
Operator 2 Euro Cents 12.83 6.41 6.49 3.39 2.70
ZAR 1.55 0.77 0.78 0.41 0.33
Operator 3 Euro Cents 12.88 10.21 4.03 2.42 1.87
ZAR 1.55 1.23 0.49 0.29 0.23
Operator 4 Euro Cents 16.06 12.45 8.32 4.52 2.71
ZAR 1.94 1.50 1.00 0.55 0.33
Operator 5 Euro Cents 11.64 8.41 8.74
ZAR 1.40 1.01 1.05





Real 2007 US 
cents
7.15 6.88 6.63 6.51 6.39
Nominal US 
cents
7.30 7.18 7.08 7.12 7.16
N$ 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.59
Glide Path for 





7.83 7.65 7.49 7.32 7.16
N$ 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59
Mobile termination costs Namibia (N$/ZAR): 
MTC being the most efficient operator
Current MTR
MTC total expenditure per minute
MTC opex per minute
MTC direct cost and depreciation per minute
MTC direct cost per minute






Mobile termination cost per minute in ZAR 
Tanzania LRIC + mark up
Australian Efficient Operator (44% market share)
Swedish Efficient Operator
French Efficient Operator (upper level)
MTC’s estimated cost of termination
Austrian Efficient Operator
Telecom Namibia’s estimated cost of termination









SA cost of efficient termination unlikely to be more 
than 25 cents
Cost based MTR: will increase competition, lower 
prices, more subscribers, wider choice of services, 
additional economic growth and employment
Other regulatory interventions will be required
